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Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug Co.: The
Narrowing Exemption of the Business of
Insurance from Federal Antitrust Scrutiny
Using as his guide a careful analysis of the legislative history of Federal
Antitrust law, the author examines two recent Supreme Court decisions
dealing with the exemption of insurance companies from Federal Antitrust
law. The author shows how there has been a consistent narrowing of ex-
emptions in the insurance area caused by the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the term "business of insurance" within the meaning of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act. The term does not include the business of insur-
ance companies, thus certain provider contracts are subject to federal law.
The Supreme Court, in Group Life & Health Ins. v. Royal Drug
Co.,1 held that provider contracts between insurance companies
and third parties for the purchase of goods and services did not
constitute the "business of insurance" 2 as contemplated by Con-
gress in the McCarran-Ferguson Act,3 such agreements thus be-
ing excluded from the Act's federal antitrust exemption.
This decision changes prior law regarding federal jurisdiction
over the insurance industry, by narrowing the scope of the indus-
try's exemption from federal antitrust scrutiny. Previously, pro-
vider contracts were exempt from federal antitrust laws; Royal
Drug has now closed that loophole.
This article will discuss the legislative and case history of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act insofar as it influenced the Court's con-
clusion in Royal Drug. Thereafter, the Royal Drug decision will
be analyzed. Finally, an examination will be made of the impact
of Royal Drug on the holding in Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co.,4 a subsequent case involving similar insurance agree-
ments.5
1. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
2. McCarran-Ferguson Act, § 2 (b), 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (b) (1945).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
4. 99 S. Ct. 1417 (1979) (agreements to set auto repair prices).
5. This article will not discuss the boycott exception to the antitrust exemp-
tion of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (b). See generally Note, Barry v. St. Paul Fire &
Marine Insurance Co.: A Re-Interpretation of the Boycott Exception to the McCar-
ran Act, 1977 DUKE L.J. 1069; Note, Insurance Regulation and Antitrust Exemp-
tions: McCarran-Ferguson, the Boycott Exception, and the Public Interest, 27
RUTGERs L. REV. 140 (1973); Recent Developments, Antitrust Law-Insurance-Poli-
cyholders May Maintain Sherman Act Antitrust Suit Against Insurer Under Boy-
cott Exception of McCarran-Ferguson Act, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 490 (1978).
I. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
A. History of Cases Prior to the McCarran-Ferguson Act
The framework of any discussion involving the insurance indus-
try vis-A-vis federal regulation, must be grounded in the case of
Paul v. Virginia6 where the Court, in effect, granted the insur-
ance industry immunity from federal jurisdiction by stating, in
dicta, that "[i] ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of
commerce . . . and "[sluch contracts are not inter-state transac-
tions, though the parties may be domiciled in different States. '7
Thereafter, it was assumed that Congress had no authority under
the Commerce Clause 8 to regulate insurance transactions.9
Hence, the states enjoyed sole regulation of the insurance indus-
try for seventy-five years until the landmark decision in United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association.l0
The Court in Underwriters, ruled the insurance industry was,
indeed, part of interstate commerce, and consequently fell within
the purview of federal regulation," (i.e., the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act12). Congressional reaction to this broad decision was surpris-
ingly swift. Within a year, the McCarran Act had clarified federal
policy made possible by Underwriters.13
B. The McCarran-Ferguson Act: Substance, Intent and
Purpose14
The Act states in pertinent part:
§1011. Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by
the several States of the business of insurance, is in the public interest,
§1012. (a) The business of insurance . . . shall be subject to the laws of
the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such busi-
ness.
6. 75 U.S. (8 Wall) 168 (1869).
7. Id. at 183. The Court equated insurance policies to personal contracts.
"They are, then, local transactions, and are governed by local law." Id.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, el. 3. For a discussion of the scope of the Commerce
Clause, see generally B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 105 (2d ed. 1979).
9. Recent Developments, Antitrust Law-Insurance-Policyholders May Main-
tain Sherman Act Antitrust Suit Against Insurer Under Boycott Exception of Mc-
Carran-Ferguson Act, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 490, 492 n.9.
10. 322 U.S. 533 (1944) (The 200 insurers in Underwriters conspired to restrain
interstate trade by fixing non-competitive prices).
11. Id. at 560.
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
13. The Act was passed in 1945, but the federal regulation effective date was
postponed until June 30, 1948. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (b). The purpose of the moratorium
was to enable the States to amend their insurance laws to conform with Under-
writers. S. REP. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
14. See also Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act's Antitrust Exemption For
Insurance Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587; Note, The McCarran-
Ferguson Act: A Time For Procompetitive Reform, 29 VAND. L. REV. 1271 (1976).
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§1012. (b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or
supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the
business of insurance . . . unless such Act specifically relates to the busi-
ness of insurance: Provided, That after June 30, 1948, . . . the Sherman
Act, and ... the Clayton Act... shall be applicable to the business of in-
surance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State law.
§1013. (b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sher-
man Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate,
or act of boycott, coercion or intimidation.
15
The primary purpose of the Act was to ensure continued state
regulation of the business of insurance,16 thus placating the dis-
traught insurance industry whose visions of federal dominion had
raised intense concern. A secondary purpose was the industry
need for an exemption from federal antitrust scrutiny to, "engage
in activities such as price fixing, loss pooling, reinsurance and in-
formation exchanges" resulting in financial solvency and status as
reliable insurers. This purportedly justified limiting the exemp-
tion to "activities closely related to ratemaking and other insurer-
insured relationships."17 The industry had grown quite comforta-
ble under state regulation during the seventy-five years following
Paul v. Virginia'8 and it vigorously argued to remain exempt
from federal law.19
The insurance industry's efforts were rewarded by the general
exemption.20 Congress did not, however, intend to return to the
pre- Underwriters blanket exclusion.21 This was evidenced by the
insertion of §1012(b) which invoked federal law to the extent not
covered by state law, and §1013(b) which carved out an exception
to the general exemption. 22 The stage was now set for judicial in-
terpretation of what was meant by "the business of insurance", 23
15. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011, 1012 (a) & (b), 1013 (b).
16. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946) (the first case in-
volving the Act after its passage which upheld its constitutionality).
17. Kissam, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Role of Antitrust Law,
1978 DUKE L.J. 487, 531.
18. See State v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 223 Ind. 198, 64 N.E.2d 150
(1945), affd mem., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Indiana, 328 U.S. 823 (1946).
19. Industry commentators charged that antitrust laws were anathema to the
insurance industry, would cause state laws governing the industry to become un-
constitutional, and that this was an attempt to federalize the insurance industry.
As a result, bills were introduced in Congress exempting the entire industry from
antitrust laws. Weller, supra note 14, at 590-602.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1012 (a).
21. See text accompanying notes 6-10, supra.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 1013 (b) applies the Sherman Act upon any act or agreement of
boycott, coercion or intimidation, regardless of state law.
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1012.
a phrase which had been left unexplained by Congress. 24
C. Piecemeal Definitions of the "Business of Insurance'25
In SEC v. Variable Annuity Co.,26 the Court was asked to deter-
mine whether variable annuity contracts 27 were policies of insur-
ance, thus exempting them from federal antitrust law via the
McCarran Act.28 In defining insurance policies, Mr. Justice Doug-
las, speaking for the Court, held the underwriting of risk essential
to the concept of insurance. 29 Thus, variable annuities were held
not to be the business of insurance and were therefore outside
the scope of the McCarran exemption.30
The leading case, SEC v. National Securities, Inc.,31 was de-
cided in 1969. There the Court further considered the scope of the
phrase "the business of insurance." The case involved the merger
of two insurance companies under state law. Holding that the
state statute did not regulate the business of insurance, the Court
defined the core of the business of insurance as, "[t]he relation-
ship between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could
be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement." 32 The
Court especially emphasized that the focus of the statutory
phrase was, "the relationship between the insurance company
and the policyholder."33 Newly armed with this general defini-
tion, the lower federal courts fell in line after the National Securi-
24. This is the only phrase relevant to the scope of this article, as the main
issue in Royal Drug, was whether provider contracts were the "business of insur-
ance," thereby deciding if federal scrutiny of the agreements would be appropri-
ate.
25. "With the exception of a few cases, for more than twenty years after the
passage of the McCarran Act courts generally assumed that the term
encompassed virtually all activities in which insurance companies and agents
engaged." Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act: A Time For Procompetitive Reform,
29 VAND. L. REV. 1271, 1281 (1976). The following cases, in the text, are the
exceptions to the general trend in the lower courts.
26. 359 U.S. 65 (1958). This action by the SEC came about to enjoin Variable
from selling annuity contracts to the public without registering them under the
Securities Act of 1933. 15 U.S.C. § 80a. In these annuity contracts, the amount of
the benefit payment fluctuated with the success of the investment policy.
27. 359 U.S. at 69-71.
28. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
29. 359 U.S. at 71, 73. The "variable annuity places all the investment risks on
the annuitant, none on the company." Id. at 71.
30. Id. at 68. There had been a split among the states as to this issue, but the
Court held it to be a federal question since it concerned Federal Acts. Id. at 69.
31. 393 U.S. 453 (1969) (Alleged security violation in the merger of two insur-
ance companies. The corporations successfully argued that a communication to a
shareholder was within the meaning of "business of insurance," Supreme Court
reversed.).
32. Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
33. Id.
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ties decision.3 4
The dearth of high court cases defining the business of insur-
ance, could be attributed to judicial reluctance to intervene in
what is generally regarded as a state concern.35 The result was
that the lower courts had only broad standards for determining
what the business of insurance involved. The standards were the
underwriting of risk36 and the relationship between the insurer
and the insured.37
With this general framework as a backdrop, the Royal Drug de-
cision can now be analyzed. This analysis will show that the
Court's conclusions in this case conform to the legislative intent
and purpose of the Act.
II. GROUP LIFE V. ROYAL DRUG
A. Facts
Eighteen owners of independent pharmacies in Texas brought
suit against the Petitioners, Group Life (known in Texas as Blue
Shield) and three other Texas pharmacies, charging violations of
the Sherman Act.38 Specifically, respondents alleged that by con-
tracting with other pharmacies in San Antonio to fix the prices of
34. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 406 F. Supp. 27 (citing
National Securities, the court held certain claims settlement practices which used
a price-fixing formula as the "business of insurance" since they were closely con-
nected with the insurer-insured relationship); Mathis v. Automobile Club Inter-
Ins. Exch., 410 F. Supp. 1037 (D. Mo. 1976) (where membership in auto club re-
quired to obtain insurance-court held McCarran exemption applicable citing
comprehensive state laws which regulated the "business of insurance" as defined
in National Securities); Ray v. Unified Family Life Ins. Co., Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1353
(D.N.C. 1977) (held relationship between insurance company and its agents not
the "business of insurance"); American Gen. Ins. Co. v. F.T.C., 359 F. Supp. 887 (D.
Tex. 1973) (involved the merger of two interstate insurance companies in which
the court ruled the McCarran exemption inapplicable since the definition of "the
business of insurance" was the relationship between insurer and insured, and not
insurance company mergers).
35. See J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW & PRACTICE § 10321 (1946); 2 CoucH
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 21:45 (2d ed. R. Anderson 1959). In fact, the first
case decided by the Court on the application of the Act to federal antitrust law did
not occur until 1978 in St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978)
(meaning of the boycott exception of 15 U.S.C. § 1013(b)). Weller, supra note 14,
at 587.
36. SEC v. Variable Annuity, 359 U.S. 65 at 71, 73 (1958).
37. SEC v. National Securities, 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969). Although this was, in
fact, a narrowing of the blanket exemption enjoyed by the industry prior to Varia-
ble.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 1.
drugs and other pharmaceuticals, Blue Shield had caused policy-
holders to unlawfully boycott their business establishments.
The agreements, which were offered to all licensed pharmacies
in Texas, called for participating pharmacies to dispense drugs to
policyholders at the rate of two dollars per prescription. Blue
Shield would then pay the pharmacies the acquisition cost of the
drugs. Assureds who frequented the non-participating pharma-
cies were charged the full retail price and were then reimbursed
at the rate of seventy-five percent of the retail price over two dol-
lars. This formula contained an inherent penalty for those policy-
holders who did business with respondents, 3 9 those pharmacies
that could not afford to profitably participate at the two dollar
markup ceiling imposed by the agreements. 40
The United States District Court for the Western District of
Texas 41 granted summary judgment for Blue Cross, citing the Mc-
Carran-Ferguson insurance exemption to antitrust laws.42 Addi-
tionally, it was held that the agreements were the "business of
insurance" under §1012(b), and were regulated by state law and
were not boycotts within the meaning of §1013(b).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed,43 holding the agreements
were not the business of insurance and therefore not shielded
from federal antitrust laws.44
Certiorari was granted to resolve intercircuit conflicts regarding
the definition of "the business of insurance." 45
39. Insured who traded at participating pharmacies would pay two dollars re-
gardless of the retail cost of the drug, while insureds who traded at non-participat-
ing pharmacies would pay proportionately more as the retail cost rose, in addition
to the requirement of filing a claim for reimbursement. See 440 U.S. 205, 209 n.3
(1979).
40. This resulted in a saving to Blue Shield since they would only be liable for
the wholesale cost of the drugs to participating pharmacies and for seventy-five
percent of the retail cost over the two dollar deductible to insureds who dealt with
non-participating pharmacies.
41. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 415 F. Supp 343 (W.D. Tex.
1976).
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015.
43. Royal Drug Co. v. Group Life & Health Ins. Co., 556 F.2d 1375 (5th Cir.
1977).
44. Id. at 1387. The Court recognized that this decision was contrary to other
circuit decisions involving similar agreements which were designed to lower the
cost of providing goods and services to policyholders. Compare Anderson v. Medi-
cal Service of the District of Columbia, 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977) (agreements
between physicians and medical insurance company) and Frankford Hospital v.
Blue Cross, 554 F.2d 1253 (3d Cir. 1977) (agreements between hospitals and medi-
cal insurance company). The court in Royal Drug recognized the relationship be-
tween the agreements and premium rates, but declined to validate the contracts
as the business of insurance, claiming the relationship between Blue Shield and
the participating pharmacies too attenuated to allow the exemption. 556 F.2d at
1384.
45. Royal Drug is the only circuit case holding such agreements to be outside
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B. The Court's Analysis
The Supreme Court, at the onset, premised its decision on the
basis that the exemption covered only the business of insurance
and not the business of insurance companies as stated in SEC v.
National Securities.46
The object of inquiry was whether the provider contracts in-
volved were the business of insurance as contemplated by Con-
gress in its ordinary meaning and usage.
In citing SEC v. Variable47 the Court reemphasized the impor-
tance of spreading and underwriting risk as essential elements of
insurance. In the instant case, the Court saw no element of risk
underwriting in the agreements since they were made between
the insurance company and third parties. The Court differenti-
ated between the actual insurance policy, which underwrites the
risk of sudden loss to the insured, and the provider contracts,
which merely served to minimize Blue Shield's cost of providing
such coverage. This cost savings arrangement, said the Court,
while necessary to provide coverage, does not, by itself, result in
the business of insurance. The Court reasoned that the insured
had no interest whatsoever in the provider contract, so long as
they received the bargained for benefits of the policy.48
It can be seen that this relationship is a vital primary element
to a finding that the business of insurance is the "relationship be-
tween insurer and insured."49 Justice Stewart saw no relation-
ship between Blue Shield and its policyholders, within the
meaning of the above phrase, in a contract for the provision of
goods and services with third parties, where the sole purpose was
to lower Blue Shield's cost of coverage. Legislative intent was not
so broad as to include every business decision made by insurance
companies within the exemption. 50 On the contrary, their intent
was to give the industry only a narrow exemption from federal
the Act's exemption. See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262
(D.C. Cir. 1977) (auto repair shops); Frankford Hospital v. Blue Cross, 554 F.2d
1253 (3d Cir. 1977) (hospitals); Anderson v. Medical Services of the District of Co-
lumbia, 551 F.2d 304 (4th Cir. 1977) (doctors).
46. 393 U.S. 453, 459-60 (1969).
47. 359 U.S. 65 (1959).
48. 440 U.S. at 214. The contracts were viewed as legally indistinguishable
from any business agreement made by the insurance company in the day-to-day
affairs of running an efficient business. Id. at 215.
49. 393 U.S. at 460.
50. 440 U.S. at 217.
antitrust laws. 51
Reflecting upon Congressional debate prior to passage of the
Act, the Court also noted a major concern of the legislators was
that intra-industry ratemaking be included in the exemption. 52
This view has long been recognized in the lower federal courts
and was previously validated by the Supreme Court in the Na-
tional Securities case.5 3 The Court placed great weight on Con-
gress' previous rejection of a version of the Act, which contained
several specific exemptions to federal laws as being too broad.54
Significantly, none of these proposed exemptions involved pro-
vider contracts. 55 Thus, the passage of the final bill was construed
as part of the overall narrowing of the exemption intended by
Congress. Justice Stewart reasoned that the only conclusion pos-
sible in this matter was that Congress did not intend for provider
contracts to be considered as "the business of insurance" within
the meaning of the Act.56
The Court's conclusion is significantly reinforced with the reali-
zation that health care plans, similar to the one at bar, were not
considered to be the business of insurance at the time of the Act's
passage.5 7 The primary case in point is Jordan v. Group Health
Ass'n.58 After noting the similarities between the agreements in-
volved in Jordan and those in Royal Drug,59 the Court surmised
that the adverse decision in Jordan prior to the passage of the Act
would have made it clear to Congress such contracts were not the
51. See text accompanying notes 20-22, supra.
52. 440 U.S. at 221-24. Chaos was foreseen if competitive ratemaking practices
were allowed, since the industry had no way to control cost without cooperative
efforts. This was seen as the essential "spreading of risk" factor, so implicit in the
definition of insurance.
53. SEC v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S 453, 460 (1969) (merger of two in-
surance companies). See Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262,
264 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (auto repair shop price setting formula); Travelers Insurance
Co. v. Blue Cross of W. Pa., 481 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1973) (hospital insurance rates
tied to benefit ceiling); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross of Greater Phil., 431 F. Supp. 5,
10 (D.C. Pa. 1975) (hospital insurance agreements related to ratemaking); but see
Hill v. National Auto. Glass Co., 293 F. Supp. 295, 296 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (McCarran
not applicable to similar provider contracts; apparently cost effect on rates was not
enough to invoke exemption).
54. 440 U.S. at 222 n.29.
55. Id. at 222. Under the proposed exemptions, the states were to have exclu-
sive control over questions of "risks, rates, premiums, commissions, policies, in-
vestments, reinsurance, capital requirements, and items of that nature." 440 U.S.
at 222 n.29.
56. Id. at 224.
57. Id. at 225-27.
58. 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (Contract between insurance company and
physicians for compensation for services rendered to insureds held not to be
"business of insurance").
59. Provider contracts for medical services and supplies which would be ad-
ministered to the insured by third parties.
[Vol. 7: 763, 19801 Business of Insurance Exemption
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
business of insurance. 60
Finally, the Court stated that all exemptions to antitrust laws
are narrowly construed, and that an entity forfeits its exemption
by acting with a nonexempt party.61 Thus construed, provider
contracts with pharmacies, doctors, lawyers, hospitals, etc., for the
provision of goods and services to policyholders are now clearly
subject to the various provisions of federal antitrust laws.62 While
this result may be criticized as creating an overly broad exclusion
to the McCarran exemption, it is undeniable that the Court's con-
clusion was grounded in a thorough analysis of legislative intent.
C. Dissent
Justice Brennan, in a vigorous dissenting opinion, argued that
the contracts in question should be construed as falling within
"the business of insurance." Citing National Securities,63 he as-
serts that the policy transfers the risk of loss from the policy-
holder to Group Life and thus qualifies as an insurance
transaction.64 The dissenting opinion also states that the concept
of insurance is not frozen, but rather is in a constant state of flux,
changing with needs of policyholders. 65 This premise, it is con-
tended, would place provider contracts within the modern defini-
tion of insurance.
The dissenting opinion fails to come to grips with the fact that
insurance policies themselves are not at issue. They indeed
transfer risk, but the provider contracts do not. The agreements
merely lower Group Life's cost of providing benefits and do not
concern the policyholder. In addition, Justice Brennan's argu-
ment does not explain how such agreements, which were held not
to be insurance at the time of the Acts' passage,66 have evolved
into the business of insurance today.
60. 440 U.S. at 229-30. Jordan specifically distinguished insurance companies
from Blue Shield type cooperatives, "[Insurance companies] are concerned prima-
rily, if not exclusively, with risk. . . [cooperatives are] concerned principally with
getting service rendered ... [t]heir primary purpose is to reduce cost .... 107
F.2d 239, 247 (D.C. Cir. 1939) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
61. 440 U.S. at 231.
62. Id. at 232 n.40.
63. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
64. 440 U.S. at 239 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 238.
66. Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n., 107 F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
The dissent asserts that in FTC v. National Casualty Co.,67 a
case decided in 1958, the Court held insurance advertising (which
does not involve risk underwriting) was the business of insur-
ance. This point was invalidated by the subsequent decision in
SEC v. National Securities, Inc. 68 which required a relationship
between insurer and insured; one wholly lacking in the instant
case.
Justice Brennan further contends that similar Blue Shield
plans were considered to be insurance in the 1930's and 1940's,
and were regulated by state law as insurance.69 Once again, it
must be noted that the insurance policy is not at issue here, but
the provider agreement themselves.7 0
The dissenting opinion's final argument is that correlation be-
tween the agreements and insurance rates is extremely high.71
Justice Brennan equates the agreements with benefit ceilings
since they limit the insurance company's liability and thereby de-
crease rates.72 This conclusion disregards Congressional intent to
exclusively exclude intra-industry ratemaking efforts from federal
antitrust coverage. 73 In addition, the provider agreements do not
effect any close relationship between Group Life and its insured,
a quality required by National Securities74 for the McCarran Act
exemption.
In conclusion, the dissent does not make a tenable case for the
argument that agreements with third parties for the provision of
goods and services constitute the business of insurance within
the McCarran Act exemption as contemplated by Congress. This
is so because the agreements lack certain essential qualities of
the business of insurance as contemplated by Congress and as in-
terpreted by the Court in prior cases (i.e., a close relationship be-
tween insurer and insured;7 5 and the underwriting of risk).76
III. THE IMPACT OF ROYAL DRUG
At this point, it is undertaken to ascertain the possible impact
67. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
68. 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
69. 440 U.S. at 242-43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 230, n.38. The mere fact that the policy itself is the business of insur-
ance does not mean that the provider contracts which necessarily follow were so
contemplated.
71. Id. at 250.
72. Id. at 251.
73. 440 U.S. at 221.
74. 393 U.S. 453, 460 (1969).
75. Id.
76. 359 U.S. 65 (1959). Although the agreements may affect rates, they do not
concern intra-industry ratemaking which was the concern of Congress when creat-
ing the exemption. Kissam, supra note 17, at 531.
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Royal Drug will have on the outcome of Proctor v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,77 currently on remand, and future cases in-
volving provider contracts. In Proctor, four owners of automobile
repair shops brought suit against five automobile insurance com-
panies in the District Court,7 8 charging that certain claims adjust-
ment and settlement practices constituted price-fixing and illegal
group boycotts. Summary judgment was granted by the trial
court and was upheld on appeal.79 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed and remanded Proctor8 O in light of the
holding Royal Drug.8 1
The price-fixing scheme alleged by Proctor involved certain
agreements made between insurance companies and participating
garages, under which the price of repairs and the amount of poli-
cyholder reimbursement were determined by a common
formula.8 2 The effect of these agreements, according to Proctor,
was to slow down legitimate price increases. The point of exami-
nation in light of Royal Drug concerns the agreements between
the insurance companies and third party automobile repair shops,
solely for the purpose of providing goods and services to insureds
at a lower cost to the insurance companies (provider contracts).
According to the D.C. Circuit Court,83 this practice constituted
"the business of insurance," thereby placing it within the McCar-
ran Act's exemption from federal antitrust laws. It is the author's
opinion that this conclusion was erroneous. This can be demon-
strated through an application of the principles of Royal Drug.
In Proctor, the lower court concluded the agreements were
within the "core" of the "business of insurance" since, "Itihe es-
sence of the automobile insurance contract is the insurance com-
pany's agreement, in return for a premium, to make payments
... for losses." 84 The court felt that since the amount to be paid
77. 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Only the "business of insurance" aspect of
the case is within the scope of this note. The claim of group boycott will not be
discussed.
78. 406 F. Supp. 27 (DC.D.C. 1975).
79. 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (McCarran exemption cited as basis of the
court's decision).
80. 99 S. Ct. 1417 (1979).
81. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
82. The formula set the cost of repairs at the "'prevailing labor rate,' a stan-
dardized estimate of the amount of labor required, and a compulsory discount on
parts." 561 F.2d at 264.
83. See note 78 supra at 270.
84. Id. at 267.
for the losses was directly related to the insurance agreement,
then the provider contract which set that rate was also vitally re-
lated, within the meaning of the Act's exemption.85
The erroneous nature of this conclusion stems from a confusion
between the provider contract and the insurance contract. The
goal of Congress in passing the McCarran-Ferguson Act was not
to exempt the business of insurance companies, but rather, the
business of insurance itself.86 This cannot include agreements
with entities wholly outside the insurance relationship.87
Secondly, the lower court relies on the impact which the agree-
ments have on insurance rates as a qualifying factor for the busi-
ness of insurance.88 This conclusion falls under the weight of the
Royal Drug edict that mere cost-savings activities are not the
business of insurance solely because they have a favorable effect
on rates. 89 The rationale for exempting ratemaking practices from
federal scrutiny pertained to intra-industry ratemaking90 and not
to inter-industry agreements which tend to lower rates in a partic-
ular instance.
Thus, we find that the agreements in Proctor should not be con-
sidered the "business of insurance" because they do not involve
the insurer and the insured, they do not spread or underwrite
risk, and they are merely cost-savings techniques wholly outside
the intent of Congress.
Iv. CONCLUSION
This article has traced the development of the insurance indus-
try's one-time blanket exclusion from federal scrutiny to the pres-
ent narrowing of the exclusion to only those activities which
directly relate to the "business of insurance" within the meaning
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
These activities as defined by the Court over the years must in-
volve a direct relationship between the insurer and insured, they
must involve the spreading and underwriting of risk, and they
must conform to Congress' intent and purpose for passing the
Act. Such purposes include the continued authority of the states
to tax and regulate the insurance industry, the exclusion of intra-
industry ratemaking from federal scrutiny, and the desire to ex-
85. Id.
86. Royal Drug, 440 U.S. at 211.
87. Exemptions to antitrust laws are to be narrowly construed. 440 U.S. at 231.
88. 561 F.2d at 269.
89. 440 U.S. at 221 n.25.
90. Id. at 221.
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clude only the "business of insurance" from federal antitrust
laws.
Specifically, this article has indicated the Court's recent deci-
sions in Royal Drug and Proctor, have held that provider con-
tracts with third parties for the provision of goods and services to
insureds, which merely tend to lower the cost of providing bene-
fits, are not the "business of insurance" within the meaning of the
Act and intent of Congress. They are, therefore, subject to federal
antitrust scrutiny.
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